

Models and tools to understand and manage interorganizational relationships: a literature review.

Introduction

In 2007, worldwide financial crisis unearthed the deep weakness of developed economic and political systems (frameworks). Namely for the public sector, narrowed between public finance crunch and wider and more complex sets of public needs to satisfy, two main issues are brought out: momentous shifts in governance patterns and ongoing adjustments in public services management and delivery.

On the governance side, environmental and institutional changes, at both inter-State (e.g. European Union integration processes) and intra-State level (increasing decentralization, subsidiarity principles enforcement, etc.) affected power balances and thus decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, scientists and practitioners have to deal with *intergovernmental relations*, encompassing «all types of interactions between elected and nonelected officials of federal state and local governments» (Kinkaid and Stenberg, 2011b).

Obviously, management patterns depend on political and institutional arrangements as well as on societal features within which are implemented. Therefore, the “new big challenge” that public managers have to face is to organize and deliver public services with fewer financial resources and in the meantime attempting to balance opposite interests and different values of increased number of involved actors. Here, we are primarily concerned with implementation and management stages of intergovernmental policies, and thus with nonelected officials tasks and responsibilities (Kinkaid and Stenberg, 2011b).

Aims and scope

Over the last decades, scientists and practitioners tried to grasp these new trends focusing either on the political-institutional side (the decision-making phase) or on the management side (the implementation phase). Therefore, so far both criss-crossing between distinct theories and the overlap and blurring of boundaries among key concepts (e.g., governance, network) have driven not only far away from an unitary vision of these issues but also from clearly defined conceptualization and widely shared principles.

However, one point at least seems to be shared by most literature: shifting in governance and management cut down both vertical (among layers of government) and horizontal (between government bodies and profit and not-for profit organizations) fences, thus blurring the boundaries of the government action (both in decisional and executive phase). In other words, in every complex system different kinds of organizations contribute to the same purpose (public needs satisfaction) by providing different sets of “resources” (financial resources, skills and competencies, power and authority, etc.). In this way, several organizations are engaged and linked to each another with different dependence degrees and intensity levels¹.

Therefore, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: could we identify some point of pooling among the different strands of literature dealing with *interorganizational relations* (IORs), *intergovernmental relations* (IGRs) and *intergovernmental management* (IGM)? If negative, to which extent scientists’ chronological and/or geographic differences (features) affected opposite visions of the same phenomena? Which solutions scholars suggested to manage this new scenario?

Research methodology

¹ That is what some scientists (Castells, 1997, Klijn 2005) defined “network society”, whose fundamental processes revolve around networks, rather than in vertical organization.

To this scope, I conducted a secondary level analysis, mainly by including scientific contributions dealing with relationships dynamics both among different layers of government (*intergovernmental relationships*) and between Public Administrations (PAs) and other organizations, either profit or not-for-profit ones (*interorganizational relationships*), as well as studies proposing solutions for their management and development (*intergovernmental/interorganizational management*).

Scientific strands that have dealt with these issues are by definition interdisciplinary in nature, as they reflect the complex and hybrid character of the kinds of relationships at issue. This research will attempt to investigate these different “approaches”, even though I “favored” contributions related to the public management field of study².

Therefore, a first selection of research sources has been carried out by using the belonging to public management discipline (field) as distinguish factor. A subsequent skimming occurred by keywords appearing in titles, subjects or abstracts, mainly: *network*, *intergovernmental* and *inter-organizational relations (management)*, *networked governance (management)*. Finally, the research has also been extended to scientific contributions by Authors whose publications has been previously selected according to the previous criteria.

The review was performed on approximately 25 journals, and 14 out of 25 were considered relevant to the research. Among these, as can be seen in Table 1, most of them have been published (edited) outside the Italian boundaries. Moreover, the research has been enriched by more than 30 monographs (or specific sections within them) published over half a century period (1953-2011).

Table 1. Relevant Sources.

JOURNAL	Reviewed papers
1. Administrative Science Quarterly	3
2. American Review of Public Administration	1
3. American Sociological Relations	1
4. Azienda Pubblica	1
5. International Journal of Public Administration	2
6. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory	2
7. Mecosan	1
8. Policy Studies Review	1
9. Public Administration	1
10. Public Administration Review	9
11. Public Administration Times	1
12. Publius: The Journal of Federalism	1
13. RIREA: Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria e di Economia Aziendale	1
14. Sviluppo e organizzazione	1

Stages of literature systematization and analysis were primarily broken down according to geographical distinction and then analyzed and combined in order to find links between the different ways in which IORs, IGRs and IGM developed within either different schools of thought or institutional arrangements.

The choice of this classification method may seem simplistic. However, a bibliographical classification based on a geographical macro-areas “mapping” should internalize some of the context differences resulting from historical, institutional and cultural features of countries in which distinct theories have been developed (see Cepiku, 2005).

² Therefore, thanks to influences from political and social sciences, public management disciplines seem to encompass a broader interdisciplinary perspective.

International literature on interorganizational relations and management.

I organize selected literature around three macro-areas: (1) English-speaking countries literature, (2) Dutch and German speaking countries literature and (3) Italian literature.

Belgium and the Netherlands literature inclusion within area (2) could be justified by common demographic (number of inhabitants), territorial (extension area), linguistic and economic factors, as well as by similar institutional arrangements (parliamentary and constitutional monarchy, respectively, and both federal-type governments³). A major stretching is German literature encompassing within area (2). However, the German literature review is limited to a single contribution (Fritz Scharpf, *Interorganizational policy studies: issues, concepts and perspectives*), and thus should not affect neither validity of the assumptions nor research methodology. On the other hand, it seems unnecessary to recall here the reasons for English literature unification with North American, Australian and Canadian ones, not only because of the wide use of *english-speaking countries* "macro-region" by scholars, but also on the basis of the scientific and cultural lowest common denominator that pervade most of the Anglo-Saxon literature, especially in economic and social disciplines.

Table 2. Selected bibliography.

Anglo-Saxon literature	Agranoff (1986); Agranoff & McGuire (1998, 1999, 2001, 2003a, 2003b); Cameron & Simeon (2000) ⁴ ; Dahl & Lindblom (1953); Emerson (1962); Frederickson (2005); Gage & Mandell (1990); Howard (1973); Kincaid & Stenberg (2011b); Levine & White (1961); Litwak & Hylton (1962); Marando & Florestano (1990); Milward & Provan (2000); O' Toole (1997); Rhodes (1997); Schick (1975); Stever (1992); Stoker (1995); Wright (1990); Wright & Stenberg (2007).
Dutch and German literature	Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan (1997) ⁵ ; Klijn (2005) ⁶ ; Kooiman (2000) ⁷ ; Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000) ⁸ ; Hanf & Scharpf ⁹ (1978).
Italian literature	Cepiku (2005, 2006, 2010); Borgonovi & Mussari (2011); Longo (2005); Meneguzzo & Cepiku (2010); Mussari (2011); Ongaro (2005).

Anglo-Saxon literature

English-speaking countries have been pioneers in both interorganizational/intergovernmental relations and management learning. That is mainly because of both institutional arrangements (e.g., federal governments need to organize and manage relationships with federated states) and long-time managerial tradition.

Not surprisingly, first publications concerning these research strands were from scientists trained in schools of thought flourished in the United States: Yale scholars (Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom) in the early fifties of the last century, sociologists from Harvard (Sol Levine and Paul E. White) a decade later, from University of Cincinnati (Richard M. Emerson), and from University of Michigan (Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton).

³ Semi-federal for the Netherlands.

⁴ Canadian literature.

⁵ Dutch literature.

⁶ Dutch literature.

⁷ Dutch literature.

⁸ Belgian literature.

⁹ German literature.

In the 1953, Dahl & Lindblom published *Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes*, thus “officially” recognizing interorganizational dynamics relevance. However, this topic has not an independent scientific dignity yet, because it emerges only within rational decision models in order to describe the behavior of engaged players (and their mechanisms of adjustment) as a function of the different configurations that the relationship between economic private activities and governmental entities could assume. In essence, while recognizing the blurring of the boundaries between public and private worlds (and their frequent overlaps), the Authors distinguish clearly between *agencies* and *enterprises*. These concepts are put to the extremes of a continuum, within there could be different degrees of *hybrid forms of organizations*¹⁰. Therefore, what becomes relevant to understand how adapting to one another were the different socio-political processes in which they occur and related forms of coordination. In this regard, the Authors (pp. 22-23) distinguish between: *polyarchy* (which identifies those forms of democratic representation extending citizens' rights up to controlling power on leaders behaviour); *hierarchy* (e.g., bureaucracy and other forms of central coordination); *price system* (market mechanisms inducing individuals to shape each other's behavior) and *bargaining* (actors behavior can be also mutually adapted through interaction in the form of negotiation and consultation)¹¹.

Within stages of negotiation and consultation among stakeholders there could be identified a first link to IORs dynamics. However, from that form of coordination should be excluded, on the one hand, forms associated with both *polyarchy* and *hierarchy* and, on the other hand, mutual adaptation mechanisms between the parties (see *partisan mutual adjustment*, Lindblom, 1965), at least to the extent to which they relate to those particular types of adaptation (unilateral or autonomous adjustment) that take place between two or more actors in the absence of interactions, as if they chose independently. In fact, while in markets the coordination between actors is developed on the basis of individual choices that the actors perform independently of each other, in a network model, these "go alone strategies" by individual actors are limited from interdependences among stakeholders. Strategies that the other players could choose are unsteady and this could have a deep impact on options for every player to achieve his purposes as well as on the ability for functioning for a proper functioning. However, it should be noted that, in a second edition of *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (1977), Dahl and Lindblom recognized their mistake of not having weighed actors socio-political influences. This rethinking affected, inevitably, on the overall economy of the interorganizational relations system.

Levine and White (1961) analyzed the IORs evolution with specific reference to the health sector, as mutually beneficial exchange systems that enable relevant parties to achieve their goals: «Interaction among organizations can be viewed within the framework of an exchange model ... [where] organizational exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives» (p. 588). This hypothesis relied on the assumption that, while organizations need basically three types of factors (clients, labor services, and resources) to achieve a

¹⁰ As recalled by Rainey and Chun (2005), «Dahl & Lindblom acknowledged the blurring and overlap among the public and private sectors, but argued that one can differentiate with reasonable clarity between *agencies* and *enterprises*. The former are government organizations and the latter are business firms, which one can locate as the end points on a continuum of governments ownership and operation, with government at one extreme and enterprises under private ownership at the other. In between these two extremes, and representing different mixtures of governmental and nongovernmental control, lie the various hybrid forms...such as state-owned enterprises, government authorities or corporation, and heavily regulated private firms».

¹¹ «Processes for calculation and control are in large part processes involving relations of leaders and non-leaders, whether these leaders be government officials or businessmen. Hierarchy is a process in which leaders control non-leaders ... Polyarchy is a process, sometimes called democracy, in which non-leaders control leaders. The possibilities of economizing are tied up with the effectiveness of this process. Bargaining is a process in which leaders control each other. The American system of checks and balances is a bargaining process; so also is political control through the great pressure groups- business, labor, and agriculture. In a price system all these relations among leaders and non-leaders are found, but in a particular form» (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953, p.23).

range of objectives, actual lack of the three components simultaneously makes it necessary continuous exchanges among organizations in order to pursue their purposes.

According to the Authors, «the interdependence of the parts of the exchange system is contingent upon three related- factors: (1) the accessibility of each organization to necessary elements from sources outside the health system, (2) the objectives of the organization and particular functions to which it allocates the elements it controls, and (3) the degree to which domain consensus exists among the various organizations» (p. 589). Therefore, dynamic feature of the *domain consensus* depends also on what different stakeholders expect about (forecast) organization's decisions.

Once defined exchange determinants, we could distinguish among distinctive components of a system in terms of *mutual interdependence*: «Certain system parts are relatively dependent, not having access to elements outside the system, whereas others, which have access to such elements, possess a high degree of independence or functional autonomy». Moreover, each type of interorganizational relationship can be considered an *involving exchange*, and his dimensions are: the *parties* involved; the kinds and quantity exchanged; the *agreement* (underlying the exchange); the *direction* (unilateral, reciprocal or joint) of the flow of organizational elements. This model suggests and anticipates some elements in common with the most recent *network theory*. Moreover, it could be extended to explain patterns of interaction among organizations belonging to separate systems.

Richard M. Emerson's *Social Exchange Theory* (1962) focused on interactions among persons with different kinds and degree of power. There could be identified different types of social relations and these power differentials derive from the relative dependencies of actors on one another for achieving the resources (money, influence, status, authority, etc.) through social exchange. Within a networked framework, relations depends on two main factors: *power* («power resides implicitly in the other's dependency») and *dependence* («the dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's *motivational investment* in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the *availability* of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation»). Potential imbalance condition occurs whenever a party has access unevenly to resources or power to control them. However, that relationships should tend towards equilibrium achievable through exchange processes, which continuously changes the *status quo* in the power allocation remixing variables of dependence. Only if we use our potential power we can influence social relation features. However, social constraints (organizational framework, motivational investment, friendship, etc.) could limit actors *potential influence*, as such as authority structures could avoid the use of power by actors.

Emerson suggested four kinds of *operations* in order to control and balance social relations, in particular that of the extension of *power network*, defined as «two or more connected power-dependence relations»¹². These balancing operations among power relations favor the formation of more or less stable - self-organized (*role structure*) and self-regulated (*status hierarchy*) – groups. According to the Author, the *authority* should be the power legitimized, invested in roles, and this "legitimacy" is seen as a particular case of the process of coalition through which rules and roles are defined.

In the same year, Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton based their *interorganizational co-ordination theory* on four main components: organizational interdependence (to accomplish organizations' goals); level of organizational awareness (the recognition by agency of actual state of interdependency); standardization of organizational activities (ascertained and repetitive behaviours); number of organizations. In particular, the Authors (p. 395) clearly distinguish the "new" *interorganizational analysis* paradigm from traditional studies on organizations, because of the distinct (perceptible) "ideal equilibrium" which societies should seek. Therefore, organizational theory dealt with determining structural requirements which are able to balance the *socially approved conflict*, unlike "old models" aiming at determining conditions ensuring *approved states of harmony*. Therefore, in order to accomplish the *co-ordination*, due to co-existence of both conflict and

¹² The others "balancing operations" were: motivational withdrawal by the weaker member; cultivation of alternative social relations by the weaker member; "emergence of status" to A, coalition and group formation.

cooperation within inadequate authoritarian structures, it needs to identify mechanisms for assuring organizations' «autonomy in areas of conflict while at the same time permitting their united effort in areas of agreement» (p.399). One of these mechanisms is the *coordinating agency*, who regulates the behavior of one or more formal organizations independent of each other, through the provision of relevant information, the identification of relevant *loci* to resolve interorganizational conflicts, the establishment of standards or the promotion of common interest areas (e.g., national trade associations)¹³. Moreover, drawing on empirical studies, the Authors showed that «co-ordinating agencies will develop and continue in existence if formal organizations are partly interdependent; agencies are aware of this interdependence, and it can be defined in standardized units of action. What characterizes the three variables in this hypothesis (interdependence, awareness, and standardization of the units to be co-ordinated) is the extent to which they are tied to the organizations to be co-ordinated». To this aim, general rules are wished «for interrelating an entire series of coordinating mechanisms, e.g., committees, laws, directories, and friendship favors».

In the first half of the seventies, Lawrence C. Howard gave voice to the widespread feeling of distrust of American citizens against the administration¹⁴. The Author ignited scientific debate on the need to re-direct the development of *executive manpower* to an approach that was deliberately intergovernmental in form and purpose. According to him, the federal system was in crisis, due to the inability of the government to obtain the necessary joint action by both central and local governments, the latter institutionally independent and often reluctant to cooperate.

Therefore, the government should regain the confidence of its citizens through the provision of services that they perceive as if in answer to their needs. However, as stated by Gaus several years before, this could not be possible «unless the resources of every level of government operating in a given area are mobilized to supplement (not supplant) each other» (Gaus, 1947, p. 80). Howard viewed the government as a single interactive system and not as a series of layers independent between them. The federal government should thus be reorganized in order to support the intergovernmental interdependence, and this presupposes the formation of «more executives, from all levels, with intergovernmental perspectives». Only by starting from inside the administration we could resolve conflicts among the various levels of government or between intergovernmental agencies. According to Howard, coeval legislative interventions adopted from Nixon administration to reform American administrative apparatus were not able to ensure the desired “intergovernmental approach to executive development”. There was a need for radical change within government systems: knowledge and tools improvement in order to administer operations at the best and in terms of output, reorganization complying with the new responsibilities to take (focusing more on processing and less on taxes and plans side), and increasing consideration of the *multinational* perspective.

Howard contribution was important for the definitive affirmation of the *intergovernmental perspective* and the focusing on the *process* stage (implementation that should involve all government levels), although it is still too focused on the role played by the federal government (and this featured this approach as clearly *top-down*).

Even Allen Schick, in 1975, drawn attention to the change of U.S. political processes, by adopting a conception of policy management that goes beyond the dogmatic dichotomy between politics and administration supported in previous decades. In this regard, the focus was on the need to manage the intergovernmental problem resulting from “Great Society” separate welfare programs everyone attempting to solve a specific social problem, and «each weaving its special relationship among functional cohorts at federal, state, and local levels» (p. 717). Although alighted intergovernmental fragmentation was not deliberately planned, it is undeniable that in part was desired by Great Society architects, in order to

¹³ This “tool” complies with intergovernmental management mechanisms stated by Agranoff (2001)

¹⁴ «Most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels. They will not - and they should not - continue to tolerate the gap between promise and performance in government». Richard Nixon, *Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union*, Washington, January 22, 1971.

redistribute the government power. This desire was fueled, on the one hand, by strong functional, political and geographical pressures and, on the other hand, by the willingness to transfer part of local and state government to categories of previously disadvantaged individuals, in the name of development of community action and of forms of participation as broad and flexible as possible. However, Schick noted that «whatever the virtues and necessities of function-based intergovernmental relations, the plain fact is that they fractured the power structures of the recipient governments».

Schick's importance depend on his constant reference to the need for coordination and functional aspects, assumptions based on the conclusions of the Study Committee on Public Management Assistance, and contained in the report *Strengthening Public Management in the Intergovernmental System* (1975): «In any government-wide thrust, it is essential that new policy management services or coordination mechanisms evolve along the lines of existing functional programs ... The alternative is superimposing what amounts to a reference service over an already complex bureaucracy and adding another functional level into the referral/evaluation/approval process».

Table 3. Interorganizational relations: The first two decades.

Year	1953	1961	1962	1962	1973	1975
Author (s)	Dahl & Lindblom	Levine & White	Emerson	Litwack & Hylton	Howard	Schick
Theory / Assumptions	Socio-political processes	Exchange model	Social Exchange theory	Inter-organizational coordination theory	Government as a "single interactive system"	Intergovernmental problem
Key Elements	Need for <u>coordination</u> <u>Bargaining</u> as interaction pattern among actors	<u>Scarcity</u> of clients, labor services & resources <u>Organizational interdependence</u> <u>Organizational domain</u>	Focus on <u>relations</u> (not on single actors) <u>Power-dependence relations</u> (depending on motivational investment, resources and goal availability)	<u>Organizations inter-dependence</u> Awareness Standardized actions Number of organizations	<u>Process Implementation</u>	<u>Function issues</u>
Tools / Mechanisms	Mutual Adjustments Weighing system for socio-economic influence of each actor (1977)	Interaction pattern within each system affected by org. function, access to elements from outside the system, consensus degree	Four balancing operations to overcome the <i>potential unbalance</i>	Coordinating agency	Executives with intergovernmental perspective	Coordination

Deil S. Wright (1990) contributed to clarify distinctive features of *federalism* (FED), *intergovernmental relations* (IGR) and *intergovernmental management* (IGM). Wright traced the historical evolution of these three models, starting from the origin of federalism in 1787 with the Philadelphia Convention, and the

emergence of the IOR with the phenomenon of the *new federalism*¹⁵ developed from the mid-30s of the twentieth century.

In particular, the Author pointed out that the concept of IGRs was contributing to shape relationship between politics and administration (from a dichotomous one to a "mixed" one affirming within the inter-jurisdictional framework). He employed the concept of *administrative politics*, introduced by Duran in 1940, in order to represent the continuum of governance processes. IGM emergence instead is much more recent and can be traced back only to the early seventies, when this strand began to emerge in the international scientific debate. Wright's contribution is crucial in the understanding of the distinctive features of the three "models" because it integrates historical analysis with a comparison (see Table 4) based on the different determinants of political power: organizations involved, power relations (authority relations), means of conflict resolution, systems of values or goals, "weight" of politics (*political quotient*) and profile of key actors (*leading actors*).

As we can see in Table 4, the shift to the intergovernmental pattern is associated with: a gradual reduction of authority from sovereign straits of government; distinctive *loci* for conflict resolution (from the laws and tribunals decisions of federalism to the markets and the games theory for IORs, to the repetitive negotiation of IGM); managerial values systems and skills; aims and scope (from compliance to problem solving, bargaining and networking). Moreover, as recalled also by Marando and Florestano (1990), «the distinguish feature of IGM is that it emphasizes the management process»¹⁶. Another important feature of IGM is that it does not comprise only governmental units: «it includes a significant degree of policy making in administration/management... and the prominent presence of private and/or nonprofit sectors in the service delivery process(es)» (Wright & Stenberg 2007).

Table 4. Federalism (FED), Intergovernmental relations (IGR) and Intergovernmental Management (IGM). Wright (1990).

System Features	FED	IGR	IGM
1. Units Involved	National-State, Interstate.	National-State-Local, State-Local, National-Local Interlocal.	IGR units plus: Politics-in-Administration Continuum, Public-Private Sector Mix.
2. Authority Relations	National Supremacy (Contingent Hierarchy).	Perceived Hierarchy (Asymmetric Orientations).	Nonhierarchy Networks (Matrix Management).
3. Means of Conflict Resolution	Laws, Courts, Elections.	Markets, Games, Coalitions.	Bargaining/Negotiation, Dispute Settlement, Coping.
4. Values	Purposes (Mission).	Perspectives (Policy-in-Administration).	Products, Program Results (Management).
5. Political Quotient(s)	High Politics (Partisanship).	Policy Making (Coordination).	Implementation (Problem Solving).
6. Lead(ing) Actors	Elected Politicians.	Administrative Generalists.	Policy Professionals.

The coexistence of public and private actors, which characterizes the IGM more than the FED and the IGR, was also detected by Robert W. Gage and Myrna P. Mandell (1990), who observed a growing «array of public and private actors [with] membership in several implementation structures». The Authors also agreed with Wright for what concern the evolution of instruments for disputes settlement and non-hierarchical authority of relational models (networks and matrix patterns). Even before Wright and others, Gage and Mandell foresaw the change that was shaping management patterns. Intergovernmental issues were making

¹⁵ Cfr. Jane Perry Clark (1938). Some Scientists (Cameron & Simeon, 2000), talk also of *cooperative federalism*.

¹⁶ «Politics, purposes, and power are subsidiary components of FED; policy, perspectives, and priorities are components of IGR; programs, projects, and procedures are aspects of IGM» (Wright, 1990, p.174).

them no longer dependent on central coordination by the federal government nor on its programs impetus and funding. The shift from a top-down approach to a conception of intergovernmental management as "bottom-up" process is invoked in James A. Stever analysis: «[Gage & Mandell] attempt to stimulate the metamorphosis of a new paradigm for IGM, one does not depend on central coordination by the federal government...the policy arenas and intergovernmental networks the authors propose are consensually created from the bottom up in incremental fashion by actors in diverse institutional settings» (Stever, 1992, pp. 347-350).

According to Robert J. Agranoff and Valerie A. Lindsay (1983), IGM can be described starting from Wright definition of IOR (involving different units and government actors in the pursuit of the objectives and the development and implementation of policies): «IGM component of the IGR, then, places emphasis on the goal achievement component of these relationships, inasmuch as management is a process by which cooperating officials direct action toward some goal»¹⁷.

In 2001, Agranoff and McGuire analyzed four different models in which public management is conceived and organized within federal arrangements, in order to verify «how policy making and management can vary within federalism across time and policy realms».

The first model, where IGM is at an embryonic stage only, is the *top-down* model. In the early '70s, Nixon administration became promoter of a model for managing relationships whose instruments were not very different from those described Wright (1990) among federalism: implementation of programs and public policies through laws, regulations and standards, binding grants, activities planning from highest levels of government, etc. The perspective was that of governing through the other levels of government (*government by remote control*). Not surprisingly, in this model we may find wide application of *agency theory*, in order to discourage actors opportunistic behavior due to the exploitation of asymmetric information by the agent (local) to the detriment of the principal (federal): «in such a bureaucratic environment, the "local manager-as-agent" perspective emphasizes the risks of discretion and the importance of compliance with external regulation and grant requirements» (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). However, the Authors recognized to the federal government its proactivity to enforce several institutional channels for the dissemination and implementation of forms of management of intergovernmental relations¹⁸.

In the eighties, both hierarchical conception of intergovernmental relations management and the top-down approaches to IGM were overcome. As already guessed by Gage and Mandell (1990), it emerged an opposing view (bottom-up), from the local to the federal level of government, in order to rebalance the system of relations within a widely shared governance model, which takes into account all actors involved in public services delivery.

In this context, the Authors developed the *Donor-Recipient Model*, according to which institutional actors are mutually dependent in the complex economy of the intergovernmental system: only joint action by multiple levels of government can help to solve a problem in effective and socially desired way. In particular, the federal government should contribute by providing financial resources (and thus it has a control function, as well as legislation and regulation prerogatives), while the local level should provide a contribution in terms of specific skills and territory knowledge (*expertise*). This model is based on *policy-implementation*, that is on studies that consider «a process of interaction or shared administration that occurs at the interaction of setting goals and carrying out actions geared to achieve them» (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). This was because of huge increase of situations requiring complementary action from various levels

¹⁷ However, a few years later (1986), Agranoff identified the IGM object in a residual manner, starting from a list of elements that cannot be brought within its domain: substantial changes of social structure, in basic power relations or fiscal responsibilities; redefinition of the relationship between the national, state and local levels; either institutional or structural intergovernmental changes in programming tasks or function allocation, etc. Therefore, the Intergovernmental management should not deal with systemic changes, rather than incremental changes and innovative activities to improve services delivery.

¹⁸ The *Section on Intergovernmental Administration and Management* (1978) and the *National Assistance Management Association* (1979).

of government. As a result, even «actors at the other end of the intergovernmental chain are involved in programming as well (Elmore 1985) creating what is now as a "bottom-up "effect» (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).

In addition to these “traditional” models the contribution of Agranoff & McGuire takes care of two “emerging” strands: *Jurisdiction-Based Model* (Agranoff & McGuire 1998, 1999) and the approaches based on the theoretical assumptions of *network theory* (which will be discussed later within the Dutch literature section).

The *Jurisdiction-Based activity* is considered the complex of activities (regulatory changes, stakeholders involvement and resources raising) that one or more local managers put in place in order to properly serve their jurisdiction (local authority, region or county, depending on institutional arrangements). Unlike the Donor-Recipient Model, here grants by higher levels of government are just one of the possible funding sources to which jurisdiction may receive, as well as the federal government is only one of the possible institutional parties to relate with within the intergovernmental system. The management perspective of intergovernmental relations is thus characterized by a greater and more complex system of interactions, in search of a mutually beneficial solution for all actors involved. Therefore, local manager function is to evaluate strategically, through cost-benefit analysis, the best way for each viable program.

Certainly, none of these models can be observed individually nor is it applied following rigid predetermined patterns. Actually, there is very often a combination of various theories, tools, and of the characteristics described above. Therefore, the importance of the study of Agranoff and McGuire, does not lie in the scope of the different explanatory and classificatory models, but as an important attempt to describe how public management evolves with the changing institutional settings that it have to grasp, even before to manage. The increasing complexity of institutional and socio-economic frameworks increasingly place side-by-side non-governmental actors to governmental ones. Nevertheless, it should be strengthened public managers role, as nowadays «they proposed strategies and work through adjustments at the boundaries of their organizations» (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001)¹⁹.

At the dawn of the third century, two Canadian researchers, David Cameron and Richard Simeon (2000) speculated that federalism itself can be considered a special case of *multi-level governance*, in which power and authority are spread among a wide range of institutions and *localities*: «these are not simply federal and provincial. Increasingly, they involve local and regional government "below", and a vast array of international and supranational institutions "above". Extending outward, they also includes quasi-governmental players, such as international tribunals, NGOs, and privatized institutions what were formerly state functions» (pp. 59-60). The multi-level governance "world" is thus characterized by multiple identities and forms of power, and is defined by interdependencies and connections, by blurred, fluid and constantly moving authority, and in which economic and social interests trespass their mutual "areas of competence" (pp. 99-104).

In 2011, John Kincaid and Carl W. Stenberg proposed a wide concept of IGRs covering all types of interactions between elected and non-elected officials, both at the federal, state and local level: «the especially important dimension of IGR is policy making - both lawmaking and regulation promulgation - in which elected officials and agency heads are important actors». However, according to the Authors the

¹⁹ Otherwise, because of the increasing complexity of inter-institutional relations, on the one hand, and of the socio-economic development, on the other hand, more and more often governments leave their traditional functions (public goods production and delivery), and increasingly use forms of privatization, outsourcing and contracting-out, mainly playing a role in planning, regulation and monitoring / evaluation of policies and programs. According to Rhodes (1997), and to Milward and Provan (2000), there was a depletion of the role of the state, more devoid of what should be its characteristic functions, the creation and dissemination of public value to the satisfaction of the needs of local authorities. As recalled by Klijn (2005), the evocative expression of "Hollow State" is just to represent the image of «a state which does not itself have to perform the policy-making and service delivery tied to the modern functions of government but in some way or another ensures that services and policy outputs are delivered by other organizations».

prerogatives of the IGM should be "confined" to implementation and management of intergovernmental policies: «politics cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but the especially important dimension of IGM is administration, in which nonelected officials (from-agency head to street-level bureaucrats) are prime actors».

Dutch and German Literature

According to Fritz W. Scharpf speculated the need for policy coordination (defined in terms of interdependence between political contributions of separated actors) does not necessarily reflect a similar need for interaction, as there could be also non-interactive modes of coordination (*unilateral adjustments*) which are relevant to all types of interdependence policy (Scharpf, 1978, p. 350-351). The Author analyzed power relations among organizations involved in interorganizational and intergovernmental processes, in the light of previous theories of exchange and dependence (Dahl & Lindblom 1953, Lindblom, 1965; Emerson, 1962). According to Scharpf, the power of an actor depends on the resources he owns and on the degree of dependence on resources held by other actors. However, he was pioneer in proposing, along with Kenneth Hanf, a new conception of the role key players must play in the management process (namely mediation and negotiation functions), and in identifying innovative tools for managing interactions, such as the *selective activation*, whereby it becomes crucial to correctly identify the necessary actors and "activate" them by creating the conditions of interest to attract substantial resources in their possession. Moreover, it begins to emerge the network concept, and its importance for «intervening in the existing structure of interrelationships in order to promote the interactions appropriate for mobilizing a concerted or coordinated effect consistent with the objective interdependencies of the problem situation» (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978, p. 12).

However, it is with Dutch literature that the network concept was elevated to paradigm. This concept was based on different theories, in particular on: organizational theories, which focused, on the one hand, on possession of resources and underlying power relations and strategies to swap them (Aldrich 1979, Pfeffer 1981), and, on the other hand, on learning and organizational restructuring (Weick 1979); public management theories dealing with both interpretation and formulation of complex decisions (Allison 1979, Kingdon 1984, Lindblom & Cohen 1979, Dery 1984). Some of the peculiarities of the network theory were: increased attention to complex character of interactions, the nature of dependencies and coordination and management strategies within the network.

One of the main exponents of this approach is Erik-Hans Klijn, who studied the network²⁰ as the "meta-place" in which a variety of actors (public or private) attempt to pursue their goals through their own strategies. In other words, networks encompass «the world of complex interactions around policy». According to this conception, no single actor is able to influence in a decisive way others actors' choices. Therefore, unlike the other models described above by Agranoff & McGuire (2001)²¹, the network approach based on *compulsory interdependence*: the leadership is widespread, collaborative, and only through interaction actors involved could achieve benefits²².

However, despite the strong incentives to operate in the network, the political processes are increasingly complex and unpredictable preferences of the actors involved can indeed change during the interaction. Thus

²⁰ For the network concept definition, see also (Mandell 1988): «Networks are conceived in terms of a cluster of organizations, a purposeful whole, rather than as many different organizations performing unrelated tasks».

²¹ In the jurisdiction-based model there was concern to achieve the objectives of the sub-national jurisdiction (emphasizing the position of superiority over other actors), while in the two "traditional" models the focus remained on the achievement of the objectives of the national / federal level.

²² On the contrary, according to Klijn (2005), widening the number of actors involved (and, thus, the expansion of the web of relationships) paradoxically worsens the closedness of the system, due to the increased intensity of interactions. In fact, each network requires the involvement of specific actors whose interests are closely related to the character and nature of the interactions.

actors could not know in advance what outcomes can be achieved or which targets may emerge during the interaction process (Kickert-Koppenjan-Klijn, 1997).

Although the concept of interdependence detected also in relation to other multi-organizational structures, such as the markets, only within the networks is possible to find the full involvement of every actor involved, which come together to relevant decisions through interaction and negotiation. Therefore, in this case the role of management is embodied in facilitating and promoting such interactions, in order to improve as much as possible the coordination²³.

According to the network theory, the focus shifted from organizations to individual actors who belong to them. In this regard, it becomes crucial the *network manager* figure, as the person «who performs and implements the coordination activities required to ensure that the interaction and joint decision making between actors, which is necessary to achieve outcomes in a interdependent world, actually takes place» (Klijn 2005). Some of the literature analyzed (Agranoff 1986, 2003; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Mandell 1990; Kickert-Klijn-Koppenjan 1997) is quite concordant with Klijn about the network manager features, in particular: power, resources and authorities are spread, and this prevents him from taking decisions unilaterally; objectives emerge only as a result of a cooperative process, as different actors have different interests and goals, and functions are less and less of controller and increasingly of moderator, process manager or facilitator; managerial activities are no longer only traditional planning and organization, but *goal seeking, perception accommodation, organizational arrangement*, and coordination.

A radical change is also required in the evaluation stages. In particular, “traditional” evaluation approaches would be unable to locate the target from which carrying out the assessment («there are a lot of actors involved, each with their own differing perceptions, goals, strategies») in order to collect necessary information («interactions are complex and knowledge is spread among different actors»). It would therefore be desirable to use a multi-actor measurement strategy that can "weigh" the different interests of different stakeholders or to measure *ex post* their degree of satisfaction.

Italian literature

The vision of public governance and networking proposed by Francesco Longo (2005) combined a conception of public administration (PA) based on a functional approach (whereby public interest protection is seen as a process “spread” among the social bodies led by PA, who sometimes exercises hierarchy) with the belief that the effective and efficient pursuit of public interest take place with the increasing use of remedies that are collaborative between public institutions and between the public and the private sector²⁴.

Power fragmentation, determined by institutional changes on the one hand, and the growing complexity of social and economic environment, on the other hand, caused the emergence of multiple “public interest networks” (*networks of governance*). Traditional management approaches are no longer able to meet these issues, while an approach based on "governance of public interest networks " should be able to organize institutions and actors involved as a system, in order to achieve a positive sum game²⁵. Longo defined networks as «a set of nodes linked by relationships and connections of various kinds»²⁶. Depending on the

²³ However, as noted by Klijn himself: «the intensive interactions between actors in sector networks tend to make these networks rather close to other actors... networks are thus not only closed because it takes transaction costs to engage in necessary interactions, or because actors within network explicitly try to secure their own positions, but also because networks rules which have been formed in earlier interactions resist to entry of other actors or simply create the kind of situation from which actors, issues, or interest are “naturally” excluded» (Klijn 2005).

²⁴ «The public interest can be best served just trying to bring to the system (to network) all the elements that hold the prerogatives critical of the government on socio-economic variables relevant directing them towards a common vision and shared public interest ... showing the benefits of collective and individual institutions that could be caused by a collaborative game» (Longo, 2005, pp. 14-15).

²⁵ To the extent to which they are the owners or holders of the power to activate the relevant resources.

²⁶ According to Butera (1990), nodes are either large or small entities that are results-oriented, relatively self-regulated, able to communicate with others and to survive in an independent manner and to communicate with other systems.

intensity of the prerogatives of government exercised by the PA pivotal in the network, on the homogeneity of the institutions and on their purpose and mission of the network, Longo respectively distinguished by: *peer networks* (in terms of the institutional role and the power exercised by the PA), *pivotal networks* (where the PA exercises, albeit without hierarchical or exclusive powers, guidance and coordination of the network) and *public groups* (where the PA is the unitary economic entity of a corporate system over which it exercises higher-level powers); *homogeneous public networks*, *homogenous mixed networks*, *heterogeneous mixed networks*, *planning, steering and control networks* (prevalent political purpose) and *coordination and services networks* (prevalent management purpose). In Table 5, are schematized tools held by the PA in order to exercise the leadership within the network.

Also integration needs for the classes of networks previously identified are distinct because they descend from the distinctive features of every network and from the kind of interdependence shaped (institutional, administrative, representative, from resources, managerial, strategic and cognitive, professional; Longo, 2005, pp. 40-44).

Table 5. Tools employed by Public Administration for leading networks (Longo, 2005).

		Kind of network		
		Peer networks	Pivotal networks	Public Groups
Tools	Institutional leadership	Prevalent	Important	Dispensable
	Authorization power	Weak	Moderate	Relevant
	Financier's role	Weak	Moderate	Relevant
	Owner's role	Absent	Absent	Absolute

In 2005, Denita C. Cepiku (2005) traced the analysis of interorganizational dynamics in the conceptual framework of public governance. According to the Author, network concept relevance depends on the needs to balance distinctive actors' interests and on the definition of the boundaries within which their relationship take place: «network are institutional and managerial solutions born by interdependence of several companies, both public and private, in order to address complex problems» (Meneguzzo & Cepiku, 2010, p. 76). Within networks is fulfilled the "harmonious composition" of vertical formal relationships with horizontal informal relationships, as well the integration of *micro*, *meso* and *macro* perspectives.

Of particular interest is the analysis of the *meso* perspective, as intermediate between two extremes - the *micro* (single public administration) and the macro one (state, market or civil society) - and consists of the "overall system of companies and government" (public sector expanded), that are the relationships within the PA and the PA system. However, it can be classified under the meso level also the network of relations that act in a intersectorial way, or the relationships between companies and PAs and the other organizations (profit and non-profit) involved in the process of creation and distribution of public value. Therefore, network governance function (Meneguzzo & Cepiku, 2010) becomes, on the one hand, to provide *network design* and, on the other hand, that of *network game/management* (managing and coordinating strategies of actors working within a network and having different goals and preferences with regard to a specific issue or policy). It is therefore crucial, especially in the activation phase, that the network manager: develops distinctive capabilities, including the ability to establish links and relationships with different actors involved in the network (by providing information consistent with their expectations); plans and arranges interactions between these actors; facilitate the relations, in particular in the inter-institutional framework; and assumes functions of brokerage (in order to balance issues, needs, solutions and actors), mediation and arbitration.

However, in a study conducted in order to test the effectiveness of network models (2006), Cepiku observed high levels of criticality in the implementation phase, and in particular a problem for traditional information systems in the presence of the diffusion of institutional models of intergovernmental inspiration (such as the

Union of Municipalities). The Author observes instead a positive impact of these reticular forms on both the sub-organizational system (sharing of financial and human resources and integrating processes) and on the sub-management system (faster diffusion of innovative management formulas, such as the establishment of mixed public-private partnerships, greater reliance on outsourcing, etc.).

According to Elio Borgonovi and Riccardo Mussari (2011), PAs could recover their effectiveness only by overcoming the rigid dichotomy between the private (the *singular*), and its individual rights recognition and of special interests protection, and the public perspective (the *plural*), which, on the contrary, is intended to protect the collective interests through recognition of social rights. The social and economic balance, both at macro and micro levels, «can only be achieved through the ability to investigate and manage the complex interdependencies between managerial organizational, economic and financial conditions establishing not only within a single administration, but also among different PAs and between them and the private companies and non-profit organizations that make up the "networks" through which both public policies are defined and public services production processes are enforced» (Borgonovi & Mussari 2011). In other words, the "plural dimension" could find within the PA the place of both connection and integration, as synthesis between two different, but complementary networks: the institutional one and the functional/managerial one (Mussari, 2011).

In particular, as also insisted Agranoff and McGuire (2001), the focus moves on processes, "operations". In the case of "institutional network" are thus analyzed processes and decision-making models, as well as systems of rules definition (with reference to Italy, fiscal federalism, vertical subsidiarity, etc.). The functional/managerial network includes instead the complex mode through which are carried out the processes of production and distribution of public services (through forms of horizontal subsidiarity, formal models of privatization, outsourcing, partnerships, local public groups, etc.). For the pursuit of the public value, the complexity of this "polycentric" model requires innovative conceptual paradigms, appropriate coordination skills, as well as specific evaluation systems, in order to take into account multidimensional performances (Borgonovi & Mussari 2011).

According to Mussari (2011), the public management (that remains inevitably a unitary process) could be considered as both *intra-organizational* (insofar as it involves the whole administrative "action", from the political bodies to the managers) and *inter-organizational* process (insofar it followed the progressive decentralization and outsourcing of public functions, concerning not only PAs but also the whole system of its economic and institutional relations). Therefore, it should ensure a smooth continuity between politicians, managers and staff functions, by identifying both individual and organizational performance objectives, in order to empower and make accountable governmental bodies.

DISCUSSION

The analysis presented in this work provides a broad and varied (though far from exhaustive) of the abundant literature on inter-organizational dynamics and the opportunities and problems arising from there.

A first consideration that could be seen from this analysis is that different interorganizational and intergovernmental approaches alternated over the years, following almost simultaneously institutional arrangements changes and socio-economic development.

A second aspect that seems to emerge is that the majority of Authors who have dealt with the issue being analyzed, even from geographically dispersed schools of thought, have developed studies and research that agreed on many of the concepts and key assumptions. On many aspects, it was more on chronological and geographical variables to differentiate the predominant object of the study. In particular, in the first period (the fifties and sixties), the subject has been treated mainly by sociologists in the analysis of the behavior of the actors involved in the processes of interaction. In this area are situated the coordination models and adjustment mechanisms by Dahl & Lindblom (1953) and Lindblom (1965), the exchange as conceptual framework for the study of interorganizational relationships by Levine & White (1961), the

interorganizational co-ordination theory developed by Litwak & Hylton (1961) and the social exchange theory of Emerson (1962), the latter based on the inverse relationship between power and dependence. However, for a specific focus on these issues we must wait for the studies by Lawrence Howard (1973) on the executives development, although these approaches still suffer from the pervasive role played by the federal government. In 1975, with Allen Schick, began to "emerge" first management tools for organizing and controlling interactions, but it is only in the next decade, thanks to Agranoff & Lindsay (1983), Agranoff (1986) and Gage & Mandell (1990), that a different perspective (bottom-up) to the studies of IGM was developed. In an innovative IGM approach as the Jurisdiction-Based Model (Agranoff & McGuire 1998, 1999, 2001), the focus of observation becomes the single jurisdiction and structure of relations established among relevant stakeholders. In particular, in this model disappear authoritative prerogatives and hierarchical control exercised by the federal government against the lower levels of government, as far based on its role as lender.

In the nineties, from the Netherlands the attention shifted to the networks (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997): the focus is no longer on a given institutional level, but on the same system of relations established between public and private actors, that is characterized by a diffuse and collaborative power structure. A few years later, the concept of network is recalled by Italian literature, and in particular by Longo (2005) and Cepiku (2005), who studied instruments for public interest networks governance and network management features, respectively. Mussari (2011) insisted instead on public management as a "inter-organizational" and "inter-organizational" process which takes place both in the vertical (inter-institutional relations with other levels of government) and horizontal dimension, resulting in relationship of exchange of resources (human, informational, economic and financial) with other entities, non-public (private companies and non-profit organizations) or quasi - public (such as, for example, portfolio companies, forms of public-private partnership).

In Table 6, the contributions were organized on the basis of a two-fold classification. First, studies were classified according to the type of relationships investigated: on the one hand, those who have dealt with the complex system of inter-organizational relations (interorganizational relationships), on the other hand, contributions that have focused specifically on the analysis of the relationship between different levels of government (Intergovernmental relationships). Secondly, a further distinction has been made according to the perspective of analysis employed: institutional (IGR and IOR) or managerial (IOM and IGM).

Table 6. An attempt of arranging interorganizational literature.

IORs	IOM		IGRs			IGM		
		NETWORK GOVERNANCE/MANAGEMENT		NETWORK THEORY	MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE	TOP-DOWN	BOTTOM-UP	JURISDICTION-BASED
Dahl & Lindblom (1953) Levine & White (1961) Litwak & Hylton (1961) Emerson (1962) Lindblom	Kooiman (2000) Mussari (2011)	Agranoff & McGuire (2003) Longo (2005) Cepiku (2005) Cepiku & Meneguzzo (2010) Klijn (2005)	Howard (1973) Scharpf (1978) Stoker (1995)	Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan (1997)	Cameron & Simeon (2000)	Schick (1975)	Agranoff & Lindsay (1983) Agranoff (1986) Gage & Mandell (1990)	Agranoff & McGuire (1998, 1999)

(1965)								
--------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

CONCLUSION

Institutional arrangements tendering towards decentralized forms of government affects the whole system of relationship among actors who are involved in "creating" public value. In particular, the rise of federal models of government could be explained through the increasing pressures by lower levels of government for major autonomy acknowledgement, even in the broader outlook of a wide rethinking of the role of governmental bodies in the socio-economic development. This issue should not be considered only from a regulatory standpoint, but also in order to take into account the overall effects that the choice of a federal system may produce on public organizations and, consequently, on their relationship systems. In fact, the different "profiles" through which these relations are expressed - namely those of responsibility, production, and financing - are reshaping in order to fit the new institutional framework and the of the socio-economic environment development.

Regard to the public sector, it should evaluate whether and to which extent these reform processes influenced services outsourcing. In particular, while these dynamics on one side "elevate" PAs by considering them as organizations in charge to ensure regulation issues, policies and programs selection, as well as planning and evaluation activities, on the other side they deprive PAs of their principal function, namely the creation and dissemination of public value in order to satisfy the constituencies' needs. As recalled by Klijn (2005), this situation has led some scientists to introduce the concept of "Hollowing State" (Rhodes 1997; Milward & Provan, 2000) representing precisely the image of «a state which does not itself perform the policy making and service delivery tied to the modern functions of government but in some way or another ensures that services and policy outputs are delivered by other organizations». Even if one accepts this criticism only in part, there is no doubt that this situation fosters the spreading of power among several actors, so bringing out a serious governance problem. Such a political process requests (joint) many "links" to enforce activities and implement programs, thus further increasing of the complexity of mechanisms necessary for coordination.

According to most literature on governance this "weakened state" could be the main cause of both network structures and cooperative relations, especially in the service delivery field (Kettl 2000, Schick 2003) . For some Authors (Schick 2003), government incapacity to respond effectively to citizens' needs - as too "distant" or too "uniform" in policies definition and service delivery – caused the "hollowing out" of the state. For others, this should not automatically result in the overcoming of vertical structures and relationships. As recalled by Cepiku (2005), should remain «inside PA the vertical relations at both micro (traditional bureaucracies) and meso-level (hierarchical relations between different levels of PA)». Therefore, the ultimate effect is not a substitution of vertical relationships and structures with collaborative relationships and network structures, but rather a co-existence of both circumstances. However, social scientists stated that one of the most interesting operational implication regards the role PA should play within networks: according to the new paradigm, in fact, network steering should not automatically be a natural prerogative of PA, as it is on an equal power level with the other entities that constitute the network (Kettl 2002; Kooiman 1993; Kickert 1997, Rhodes 1997). Therefore, future research should investigate both models and tools to be used to strengthen the coordination by PA, which is still considered the subject deputed to strategically coordinate the network whose it is still protagonist and director (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Borgonovi & Mussari, 2011).

In summary, historical traditions, socio-economic contingencies and institutional settings affected the whole system of interorganizational relations, holistically considered as a network of connections within each level of government and among different government levels: the *macro* level, (i.e. the socio-economic system as a whole), the *meso* level (consisting of relationships within PA and the PA system) and the *micro* level (the

single PA) (Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993). Moreover, at the *meso* level, this change will affect even among sectors, that is the relations between the public sector, public enterprises (which represent non-PA sector), private firms (profit and not-for-profit) and all other parties involved in the process of creation and distribution of the “public value”.

Therefore, the main issue becomes identifying which management and measurement tools could be best suited in order to grasp the “new environment” in an effective way.

In particular, it seems to overcome New Public Management prerequisites, according to which the aforesaid tasks were accomplished by borrowing theories and tools employed within the private sector. Due to the “development of the network society” (Klijn 2005) this has been no longer possible, as uncritical introduction of private-like theories and tools would no longer be able to support the government (and in particular its activities of programming, control, coordination and development of the system of relations), especially at the *meso* level or between multiple *meso* layers. In order to accomplish this goal, it is needed to investigate both pertinence and effectiveness of new approaches, such as *Intergovernmental management* (Mandell 1979, Gage & Mandell 1990, Stoker 1995; Agranoff & McGuire 2001, 2003) and theories, as such as *network theory* (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997, Klijn 2005), in order to understand and manage relationships systems, in intra-area (between different levels of government) and inter-sectorial (between the public sector and other actors) respectively.

The advent of governance as a theoretical perspective has “introduced” a competitive component once rooted only in the private sector, and this has determined the creation of networks in which the government is only one of the actors involved, and whose representatives, although democratically elected, could not have any presumption of supremacy. One of the most important new features of these models, in particular in terms of management, is thus the new role assigned to the key players. Therefore, only the ability of public managers to work on borders, edges, as well as increasingly necessary skills and negotiating contractual terms, may lead the public administration to interpret the new paradigm, not passively change the institutional framework in order to continue to propose public value that is recognized by the local authorities.

With a view to future research, we should investigate the different types of relationships that may consist of different models of interorganizational and intergovernmental relations and management. Many questions still remain without answers concerning, in particular: actual capacity of intergovernmental relations to generate policies in more effective and efficient way, even in the implementation phase, without falling back on the “primacy” of government actors within the intergovernmental network, the role that local governments should play at the “intergovernmental table”, “side mechanisms” to favor local governments enforcement, and more importantly, the identification of the actors who have to answer these questions, depending on the kind and the nature of the interrelationships. In this sense, we agree with Paolo Quattrone (2012) when he states that «different kinds of relationships depend on how you organize the space».

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AGRANOFF R.J.–M. MCGUIRE (2003a), *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Government*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.
- AGRANOFF R.J.–M. MCGUIRE (2003b), *Inside the Matrix: Integrating the Paradigms of Intergovernmental and Network Management*, in *International Journal of Public Administration*, 26, pp. 1401-1422.
- AGRANOFF ROBERT J. (1986), *Intergovernmental Management: Human Services Problem-Solving in Six Metropolitan Areas*, State University Press, New York, Albany.
- AGRANOFF ROBERT J.–MICHAEL MCGUIRE (1998), *A Jurisdiction-Based Model of Intergovernmental Management in U.S. Cities*, in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 28(4), pp. 1–20.
- AGRANOFF ROBERT J.–MICHAEL MCGUIRE (1999), *Expanding Intergovernmental Management's Hidden Dimensions*, in *American Review of Public Administration*, 29 (4), pp. 352–69.
- AGRANOFF ROBERT J.–MICHAEL MCGUIRE (2001), *American Federalism and the Search for Models of Management*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 61, No. 6, pp. 671-681.
- ALDRICH H. (1979), *Organizations and environments*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
- ALLISON G.T. (1979), *Public and private management: Are they fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects?*, Public Management Re-search Conference, November, Washington DC: Office of Personnel Management.
- ASWATHAPPA K. (2007), *Human Resource And Personnel Management*, Fourth Edition, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi.
- BORGONOV E., *Principi e sistemi aziendali per le amministrazioni pubbliche*, Egea, Milano, 2002.
- BORGONOV E. (2007), *Considerazioni per una teoria degli stakeholder nelle Amministrazioni Pubbliche*, in R.E. FREEMAN-G. RUSCONI-M. DORIGATTI (Eds.), *Teoria degli stakeholder*, Franco Angeli, Milano
- BORGONOV E. RICCARDO MUSSARI (2011), *Pubblico e privato: armonizzare gli opposti*, in E. BORGONOV E. - R. MUSSARI (Eds.), *Collaborare e competere per un mercato responsabile e solidale: Amministrazioni pubbliche, enti non profit, fondazioni, imprese cooperative, imprese sociali*, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 19-45.
- CAMERON DAVID-SIMEON RICHARD (2000), *Intergovernmental relations and democratic citizenship*, in B. GUY PETERS-D. SAVOIE (Eds.), *Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Revitalizing the Public Service*, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, pp. 58-118.
- CASTLES FRANCIS G. (1989), *Big Government in Weak States: The Paradox of State Size in the English-Speaking Nations of Advanced Capitalism*, in *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp. 267–293.
- CATTURI GIUSEPPE, *L'azienda Universale*, Cedam, Padova, 2003.
- CEPIKU DENITA (2005), *Governance: riferimento concettuale o ambiguità tecnologica nei processi di innovazione della p.a.?*, in *Azienda Pubblica*, Vol. 1, pp. 105-131.
- CEPIKU DENITA (2006), *Le reti di amministrazione pubbliche nella prospettiva economico-aziendale*, in *RIREA: Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria e di Economia Aziendale*, luglio-agosto, fascicolo 7/8, pp. 470-487.
- CEPIKU D., CONTE A., D'ADAMO A. (2010). *La valutazione multi-livello delle performance dei network di interesse generale. Analisi di due casi studio in sanità*, in *Mecosan*, Vol. 19, N. 75, pp. 23-41.
- CLARK JANE PERRY (1938), *The Rise of a New Federalism: Federal-State Cooperation in the United States*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- CLAYTON R.-P. CONKLIN-R. SHAPEK (Eds.) (1975), *Policy Management Assistance: A Developing Dialogue*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 35, Special Issue. December, pp. 693-818.
- DAHL L.E.-C.E. LINDBLOM (1953), *Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes*, Harper & Brothers, New York.
- DERY D. (1984), *Problem definition in policy analysis*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
- DURHAM G. HOMER (1940), *Politics and Administration in Intergovernmental Relations*, in *The Annals*, vol. 207, pp. 1-6.
- ELMORE RICHARD F. (1985), *Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy*, in Kenneth Hanf and Theo A.J. Toonen (Eds.), *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 33-70.
- EMERSON R.M. (1962), *Power-dependence Relations*, in *American Sociological Relations*, Vol. 27, pp. 31-40.
- FREDERICKSON G. (1997). *The Spirit of Public Administration*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
- FREDERICKSON G. (2005), *Whatever happened to public administration? Governance, governance everywhere*, in E. FERLIE-L.E. LINN JR.-C. POLLITT (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 282-304.
- GAGE R.W.-M.P. MANDELL (Eds.) (1990), *Strategies for Managing Intergovernmental Policies and Networks*, Praeger, New York.
- GAUS JOHN (1947), *Reflections of Public Administration*, University of Alabama Press, Birmingham.
- GROSENICK LEIGH E. (1973), *The Administration of the new federalism: objectives and issues*, Special publication, American Society for Public Administration, Washington.
- HANF KENNETH-SCHARPF FRITZ (Eds.) (1978), *Interorganizational policy making: limits to coordination and central control*, SAGE Publications, London and Beverly Hills.

- HOOD CHRISTOPHER (1995), *The "new public management" in the 1980s: Variations on a theme*, in [Accounting, Organizations and Society](#), Volume 20, Issues 2–3, February–April 1995, pp. 93-109.
- HOWARD LAWRENCE C. (1973), *Executive development: an intergovernmental perspective*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 101-110.
- KETTL D.F. (2000), *The transformation of governance: globalization, devolution and the role of government*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 60, No. 6, November-December.
- KICKERT WALTER J.M- ERIK HANS KLIJN - JOOP F.M. KOPPENJAN (1997), *Introduction: A Management Perspective on Policy Networks*, in WALTER J.M. KICKERT, ERIK-HANS KLIJN, AND JOOP F.M. KOPPENJAN (Eds.), *Managing Complex Networks*, Sage Publications, London, pp. 1–13.
- KICKERT WALTER J.M- JOOP F.M. KOPPENJAN (1997), *Public Management and Network Management: An Overview*, in WALTER J.M. KICKERT, ERIK-HANS KLIJN, AND JOOP F.M. KOPPENJAN (Eds.), *Managing Complex Networks*, Sage Publications, London, pp. 35-61.
- KINCAID JONH-CARL W. STENBERG (2011a), *Introduction to the Symposium on Intergovernmental Management and ACIR Beyond 50: Implications for Institutional Development and Research*, in *Public Administration Review*, March-April, pp. 158-160.
- KINCAID JONH-CARL W. STENBERG (2011b), *"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them?*, in *Public Administration Review*, March-April, pp. 196-202.
- KINGDON JOHN W. (1984), *Agendas, alternatives, and Public Policies*, Little, Brown (Boston).
- KLIJN ERIK-HANS (2005), *Networks and inter-organizational management: challenging, steering, evaluation, and the role of public actors in public management*, in E. FERLIE-L.E. LINN JR.-C. POLLITT (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 257-281.
- LEVINE S.-P.E. WHITE (1961), *Exchange as a conceptual framework for the study of interorganizational relationships*, in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 583-601.
- LINDBLOM C.E. (1965), *The intelligence of democracy: decision making through mutual adjustment*, Free Press, New York.
- LINDBLOM CHARLES E.- DAVID COHEN (1979), *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- LITWAK E.-L.F. HYLTON (1962), *Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies*, in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 395-420.
- LONGO FRANCESCO (2005), *Governance dei network di pubblico interesse: logiche e strumenti operativi aziendali*, EGEA, Milano.
- MANDELL M.P. (1979), *Letters to the Editor: Intergovernmental Management*, in *Public Administration Times*, Vol. 2, December 15.
- MANDELL M.P. (1988), *Intergovernmental Management in Interorganizational Networks: A Revised Perspective*, in *International Journal of Public Administration*, 11(4), pp. 393–416.
- MANDELL M.P. (1999), *The Impact of Collaborative Efforts: Changing the Face of Public Policy Through Networks and Network Structures*, in *Policy Studies Review*, Spring 1999, 16 (1), pp.3-17.
- MARANDO V.L.-P.S. FLORESTANO (1990), *Intergovernmental Management: the State of Discipline*, in LYNN N.B.-A. WILDAVSKY (Eds.), *The state of The Discipline*, Chatan House, Chatman, NJ, pp. 287-317.
- MARKS GARY (1996), *Structural policy and multilevel governance in the EC.*, in J. KLAUSEN-L. TILLEY (Eds.), *Processes if European Integration, 1880-1995: States, Markets and Citizenship*, *National Tax Journal*, June, No. 49.
- MARTONE A. (2002), *La gestione strategica delle Regioni, politiche, federalismo e sussidiarietà in una prospettiva economico-aziendale*, Guerini e Assoicati, Milano.
- MENEGUZZO M., CEPIKU D., DI FILIPPO E., (Eds.) (2006), *Managerialità, innovazione e governance nella Pubblica Amministrazione*, Aracne, Roma.
- MENEGUZZO M.-CEPIKU D. (2010), *Coordinamento e gestione strategica delle reti. Profili e competenze dei network manager*, in *Sviluppo e organizzazione*, 238, pp. 74-85.
- MILWARD H.B.-K.G. PROVAN (2000), *Governing the Hollow State*, in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 359-379.
- MOORE MARK HARRISON (1995), *Creating public value: strategic management in government*, Harvard University Press.
- MUSSARI RICCARDO (2011), *Economia delle amministrazioni pubbliche*, McGraw-Hill, Milano.
- O' TOOLE LAURENCE J., (1997), *Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas* In *Public Administration*, in *Public Administration Review*, 57(1), pp. 45 - 52.
- ONGARO EDOARDO (2005), *Pratiche per la Gestione del Decentramento e modelli di Intergovernmental Management*, in AA.VV. *La gestione del decentramento, governance e innovazione organizzativa nell'esperienza di regione ed enti locali in Lombardia*, Giuffrè, Milano, pp. 185.216.
- PFEFFER J. (1981), *Power in Organizations*, Pitman Pub., Marshfield, Mass.
- POLLITT C.-G. BOUCKAERT (2000), *Public Management reform: a comparative analysis*, University Press, London.
- PRESSMAN JEFFREY L. (1975). *Federal Programs and City Politics: The Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.
- PRESSMAN JEFFREY L.-WILDAVSKY AARON (1984), *Implementation*, 3rd ed. Berkeley, C, University of California Press.

- RADIN BERYL A. et ALII (1996), *New Governance for Rural America: Creating Intergovernmental Partnerships*. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas.
- RAINEY, H. G.- Y.H. CHUN (2005), *Public and private management compared*, in E. FERLIE-L. E. LYNN-C. POLLITT (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 72-102.
- REBORA G.-M. MENEGUZZO. (1990), *Strategia delle amministrazioni Pubbliche*, Utet, Torino.
- RHODES R.A.W. (1997), *Understanding governance, policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability*, Open University Press, Buckingham.
- SCHARPF FRITZ (1978), *Interorganizational policy studies: issues, concepts and perspectives*, in HANF KENNETH-SCHARPF FRITZ (Eds.), *Interorganizational policy making: limits to coordination and central control*, SAGE Publications, London and Beverly Hills, pp. 345-370.
- SCHICK ALLEN (1975), *The Intergovernmental Thicket: The Questions Still Are Better Than the Answers*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 35, Special Issue, *Policy Management Assistance: A Developing Dialogue*, December, pp. 717-722.
- SCOTT C. (2003), *Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of Post-Regulatory State*, National Europe Centre Paper, No. 100, Australian National University.
- SIMEON RICHARD (1977), *The politics of fiscal federalism*, in T.J. COURCHENE-K. BANTING (Eds.), *The Future of Fiscal Federalism*, School of Policy Studies, Kingston.
- SMILEY D.V. (1979), *An outsider's observations of intergovernmental relations among consenting adults*, in R. SIMEON (Ed.), *Confrontation or Collaboration: Intergovernmental Relations in Canada Today*, Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Toronto.
- STEVEY J.A. (1992), *Intergovernmental Management in a revolutionary era*, in *Journal of Public Administration, Research & Theory*, Vol. 2, 347-350.
- STOKER G. (1995), *Intergovernmental relations*, in *Public Administration*, vol. 73, Issue 1, March 1995, pp. 101-122.
- SUNDQUIST, JAMES L.-DAVID W. DAVIS (1969), *Making Federalism Work*, The Brookling Institution, Washington D. C.
- THOMAS J., *Effects of Facilitative Role Interdependence on Group Functioning*, in *Human Relations*, No. 19, pp. 347-366.
- WEICK KARL E. (1979), *The social psychology of organizing*, Addison-Wesley Pub., Reading, Mass.
- WHITE P.E.-S. LEVINE-G.J. VLASAK (1975), *Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for Understanding Interorganizational Relationships: Applications to Non-Profit Organizations*, in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (March), pp. 583-601.
- WRIGHT DEIL S. (1978), *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, Duxbury, North Scituate, Mass.
- WRIGHT DEIL S. (1990), *Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management, Historical Reflections and Conceptual Comparisons*, in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 168-178.
- WRIGHT DEIL S.-CARL W. STENBERG (2007), *Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and Intergovernmental Management: the Origins, Emergence, and Maturity of Three Concepts across Two Centuries of Organizing Power by Area and by Function*, in JACK RABIN, W. BARTLEY HILDRETH, GERALD J. MILLER (Eds.), *Handbook of Public Administration*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, pp. 407-480.